

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-15 SSO-00 /028 W  
-----088169 221908Z /40

O 221829Z MAR 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0186

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 03021

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FOR EUR/RPM ONLY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: NATO  
SUBJECT: THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: OBJECTIVES, INITIATIVES,  
AND CONSULTATIONS

REF: RPM MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 17, 1978

SUMMARY: WE HAVE READ THE REFERENCED MEMORANDUM. WE  
DISAGREE WITH SOME OF IT. IN OUR VIEW, THE BASIC  
OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT SHOULD BE (A) TO MAKE THE  
PUBLIC AWARE THAT THE LONDON INITIATIVES HAVE BEEN  
SUCCESSFUL AND THAT THE ALLIES ARE NOW IN A  
POSITION TO SET THE COURSE FOR "THE ALLIANCE IN  
THE 80'S" AND (B) TO GAIN THE HIGHGROUND FOR THE  
ALLIANCE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. ON FUTURE  
NATO WORK, THE SUMMIT SHOULD ENDORSE AND IMPLEMENT  
INITIATIVES TAKEN AT LONDON AND HOLD BACK ON NEW  
INITIATIVES AT THIS STAGE -- EXCEPT PERHAPS IN REGARD  
TO THE EAST/WEST STUDY. A SUMMARY OF THE STUDY  
SHOULD BE PUBLISHED. LOOKING TO THE SSOD, AND  
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN ON THE  
"NEUTRON BOMB", WE SEE A NEED TO POINT UP SOVIET  
ACTIVITIES IN THE NUCLEAR AND DEFENSE FIELD AS  
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CENTRAL CONCERNS AND TO ADVANCE A FEW STRIKING  
NEW INITIATIVES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. TO  
STIMULATE WASHINGTON'S THINKING, WE PROVIDE  
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF NEW INITIATIVES, SOME  
OF WHICH, WE ACKNOWLEDGE, ENTAIL OBVIOUS  
DRAWBACKS. WE DO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT  
WITH THE ALLIES EARLY TO GET THEIR IDEAS AND

TO SEE WHAT CHANCE SOME OF OUR OWN MAY HAVE. BY ALL MEANS, LET US AIM TO GET TO THE ALLIES OUR PROPOSALS, HOWEVER TENTATIVE, BY APRIL 10. ENDSUMMARY.

1. SUMMIT OBJECTIVES FALL INTO TWO CATEGORIES: THOSE REGARDING THE ALLIANCE AND ITS INTERNAL ACTIVITIES AND THOSE REGARDING THE POSITION OF THE ALLIANCE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT. IN BOTH AREAS, WE BELIEVE, CENTRAL THEMES SHOULD BE SIMPLE, FORWARD-LOOKING, AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD BY THE PRESS AND PUBLIC.

2. IN REGARD TO NATO, THE OVERALL THEME SHOULD BE "THE ALLIANCE FOR THE 80'S." THIS SUMMIT SHOULD BE PRESENTED WITH A LOGICAL FOLLOW ON TO THE LONDON SUMMIT INITIATIVES. IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS A MEETING OF ALLIED HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT TO SET THE BASIC COURSE AND TASKS FOR THE ALLIANCE IN THE DECADE AHEAD.

3. THE PRESIDENT'S LONDON PROPOSALS, AS AMPLIFIED IN WASHINGTON, SHOULD PROVIDE PLENTY OF WORK FOR NATO IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE SEE NO NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES AIMED AT STIRRING INTERNAL NATO ACTIVITY, EXCEPT IN SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
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LONDON INITIATIVES. THE AIM SHOULD RATHER BE TO UNDERLINE THE COMMITMENT OF ALLIED LEADERS TO INSURE THAT THEIR NATIONS INDIVIDUALLY WILL FULFILL THE DEFENSE TASKS PROPOSED IN LONDON AND THAT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES WILL ADDRESS THE ISSUES POSED FOR THE ALLIANCE BY OBJECTIVE EXPECTATIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE SUMMIT SHOULD THUS FEATURE THE FOLLOWING ALLIANCE RELATED ACTIVITIES:

-- THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM;

-- THE TRANS-ATLANTIC DIALOGUE

-- THE COMMITMENT OF THE ALLIANCE TO A 3 PER CENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES;

-- THE RESULTS OF THE EAST-WEST STUDY AND FOLLOWUP OF THE STUDY.

3. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO PUBLICIZE AN UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY

ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THEIR  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. PROSPECTS FOR THE EAST,  
AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE USSR, SHOULD BE FEATURED  
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ALLIANCE FACES CLEAR  
EXTERNAL CHALLENGES IN THE YEARS AHEAD AND THAT  
ALLIANCE ACTIVITIES IN THE DEFENSE AND POLITICAL  
FIELDS WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD MEETING THESE CHALLENGES.  
(US SUPPORT FOR PUBLICATION OF AN UNCLASSIFIED  
SUMMARY OF THE STUDY WILL BOTH REAFFIRM TO THE  
ALLIES THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO THE  
STUDY AND, WE BELIEVE, REASSURE THE FRENCH THAT AN

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-15 SSO-00 /028 W

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AGREED VERSION, RATHER THAN A LEAKED VERSION, IS  
WHAT THE US HAS IN MIND FOR THE PUBLIC.)  
PRESENTATION OF THE STUDY SHOULD ALSO SERVE:  
AS CONFIRMATION OF A UNIFIED ALLIED VIEW ABOUT THE  
NATURE OF THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY; AS A  
POLITICAL/CONCEPTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE LTDP; AS A  
BACKGROUND TO INITIATIVES TOWARD THE EAST THAT  
THE ALLIANCE MAY PROPOSE; AND AS A LEAD INTO  
ADDITIONAL ALLIED WORK TO FOLLOW UP THE STUDY.

4. IN THE LATTER AREA WE HAVE A MODEST  
PROPOSAL: THAT THE COUNCIL (SPC) PREPARE A  
BRIEF ANALYSIS FOR MINISTERS FOR THE SPRING  
1979 MINISTERIAL ON HOW DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN  
EUROPE ARE CONFIRMING, OR BELYING, THE TRENDS  
PREDICTED BY THE STUDY. SUCH A REPORT COULD  
PROVIDE AN INTELLECTUALLY INTERESTING  
EXERCISE, KEEP THE EAST-WEST STUDY OFF  
THE SHELF, AND MAKE IT AN ACTIVE REFERENCE  
POINT FOR ALLIED ANALYSIS OF WHAT IN FACT IS

HAPPENING IN THE EAST.

5. ON DISARMAMENT, WE THINK IT CRUCIAL AT THIS  
STAGE THAT THE ALLIANCE GAIN THE HIGH GROUND  
IN THE "STRUGGLE FOR PEACE" AND THAT THE SUMMIT  
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POINT UP SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE DEFENSE FIELD  
AS THE PROBLEM ALLIED PUBLICS SHOULD BE  
CONCERNED ABOUT. WE SAY THIS AGAINST THE BACKGROUND  
OF THE PARTLY SUCCESSFUL SOVIET CAMPAIGN TO  
IDENTIFY AS THE SCARIEST ISSUE IN EUROPE A US  
TECHNICAL ACHIEVEMENT RELEVANT TO ALLIED THEATER  
NUCLEAR FORCE IMPROVEMENT, "THE NEUTRON BOMB."  
AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE PROCEEDING  
APACE TO UPGRADE THE NUCLEAR POWER THAT THEY  
CAN BRING TO BEAR ON WESTERN EUROPE. THE PRESENT  
DYNAMICS IN THIS AREA ARE DEBILITATING FOR THE  
ALLIANCE. THEY ARE A CLEAR SETBACK FROM THE  
STRONG POSITION THE PRESIDENT'S DISARMAMENT  
INITIATIVES GAVE TO THE WEST AT THE BEGINNING OF  
HIS ADMINISTRATION. WE MUST JOIN THIS ISSUE HEAD  
ON IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. (THE OUTCOME OF  
CONSULTATIONS ON THE ERW WILL BE FUNDAMENTAL  
TO THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIED POSITION, BUT  
WE CAN PLAN AHEAD TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE  
HAND WHATEVER THE OUTCOME ON ERW.)

6. WE THUS SEE A NEED FOR ALLIED PROPOSALS THAT  
WILL FINGER THE USSR. SUCH STEPS SHOULD NOT BE DIS-  
MISSED AS PROPAGANDA OR A RETURN TO THE SLANGING  
MATCH OF THE FIFTIES. ALLIED PROPOSALS  
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS CAN BE USEFUL IN RIGHTING  
THE BALANCE IN TERMS OF PUBLIC CONCERNS AND IN  
HIGHLIGHTING, THROUGH JUXTAPOSITION IN THE PRESS,  
THE UNBALANCED NATURE OF THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN.  
WE SEE A NEED FOR A TOUGH AND IMAGINATIVE  
LOOK AT THIS PROBLEM. ILLUSTRATIVELY, WE  
SUGGEST CALLING ON THE USSR NOT TO DEPLOY  
ADDITIONAL SS-20'S AND TO WITHDRAW 5000 TANKS  
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FROM CENTRAL EUROPE. THESE PROPOSALS COULD BE  
COUPLED WITH RECIPROCAL ALLIED OFFER  
OF RESTRAINT, BUT SUCH AN OFFER NEED NOT BE  
PREREQUISITE TO CALLING ON THE USSR FOR UNILATERAL

ACTION. MIGHT SOMETHING ALSO BE PROPOSED IN THE  
NUCLEAR FIELD? E.G. CALLS NOT TO DEPLOY CITY  
BLASTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST CENTRAL EUROPE,  
NO INTRODUCTION OF MIRV'S IN NON-CENTRAL SYSTEMS,  
DAMAGEOR LIMITATIONS ON YIELD OF  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE?

7. IN THE FIELD OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WE  
BELIEVE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE ALLIES TO TAKE  
STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EAST AND TO  
REDUCE TENSIONS IS SELF EVIDENT. THIS WILLINGNESS  
SHOULD BE REAFFIRMED AT THE SUMMIT, BUT WE THINK  
IT SHOULD BE A SUBORDINATE THEME. A FEW PROPOSALS  
HIGHLIGHTING OPEN VERSUS CLOSED SOCIETIES MIGHT  
BE USEFUL, E.G.:

(A) A CALL FOR ELIMINATION OF TRAVEL  
RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN VISITORS IN WP AND ALLIED  
COUNTRIES AND A STATEMENT OF ALLIED WILLINGNESS  
TO IMMEDIATELY ELIMINATE SUCH RESTRICTIONS ON  
A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

(B) A PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL PUBLIC AVAILABILITY  
OF MEDIA (TELEVISION AND PRESS) IN WP AND NATO  
COUNTRIES FOR DEBATE AND PRESENTATION OF POSITIONS  
ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES: E.G. A MEET THE PRESS  
FORMAT WITH ALLIED AND WP OFFICIALS. (A PUBLICLY

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-15 SSO-00 /028 W  
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FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0188

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ORIENTED PROPOSAL OF THIS KIND WOULD REPLACE A  
POSSIBLE PROPOSAL FOR REGULAR MEETINGS OF THE NAC  
AND WP POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT.  
WE DO NOT FAVOR THAT PROPOSAL. WE SEE NO

ALLIED INTEREST IN STRENGTHENING WP CONSULTATIVE ACTIVITY (NOR WOULD ROMANIA) AND A MORE PUBLICLY ORIENTED PROPOSAL WOULD PLACE THE ALLIANCE ON STRONG GROUND.)

(C) A PROPOSAL BY THE US IN THE CBMS FIELD TO INVITE WP(AND OTHER CSCE COUNTRIES) TO OBSERVE MANEUVERS IN THE US. (WE BELIEVE THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE MORE STRIKING THAN A RESURFACING OF THE DETAILED ALLIED CBM PROPOSALS).

8. ON MBFR, WE THINK WE SHOULD LET THE NEGOTIATING PACE DETERMINE WHEN TO PUT FORWARD THE NEW ALLIED AND OTHER INITIATIVES. ALLIES COULD, OF COURSE, HIGHLIGHT THESE INITIATIVES AT THE SUMMIT IF APPROPRIATE. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE OR SUFFICIENTLY STRIKING TO ATTEMPT TO USE MBFR AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT FOR ALLIED EAST-WEST PROPOSALS.

9. ON CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, WE FAVOR A VIGOROUS ALLIED AFFIRMATION OF THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALL  
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SIGNATORIES OF THE FINAL ACT LIVE UP TO THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THEY ACCEPTED AT HELSINKI AND TO MAKE THE CSCE PROCESS MEANINGFUL IN THE LIVES OF INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES. WE WOULD NOT ADVANCE SPECIFIC NEW HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS AT THE SUMMIT, BUT RATHER EMPHASIZE THE ALLIED COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

10. WE FAVOR DEVELOPING THROUGH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES A FEW INITIATIVES TOWARD THE EAST THAT ALL ALLIES COULD SUPPORT. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTY OF ACHIEVING UNANIMOUS SUPPORT, WE BELIEVE THE US SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED AT THE SUMMIT TO ANNOUNCE UNILATERAL INITIATIVES (SUCH AS ONE WE SUGGESTED ON CBM'S). UNILATERAL INITIATIVES MIGHT NOT BE REFLECTED IN DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AT THE SUMMIT, BUT WITH ALLIED CONSENT THEY COULD BE ANNOUNCED TO THE PRESS AS STEPS THE PRESIDENT INFORMED THE SUMMIT THE US WOULD TAKE.

11. IN CONSIDERING WHAT INITIATIVES MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIES, WE HAVE VERY MUCH IN MIND FRENCH RESERVATIONS REGARDING CBM'S, MBFR, AND BLOC-TO-BLOC INITIATIVES IN GENERAL. WHILE FORMULAS MIGHT BE FOUND TO ACCOMMODATE THE

FRENCH, WE MUST EXPECT THAT FRENCH RESISTANCE MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTANCE OF PROPOSALS FOR EAST-WEST POLITICAL EXCHANGES, MBFR PROPOSALS, AND ALLIANCE-WIDE CBM PROPOSALS. FRENCH FLEXIBILITY IN THE POST-ELECTION PERIOD SHOULD BE TESTED HOWEVER.

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12. AS TO THE DOCUMENTS THAT MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE SUMMIT, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES WILL WANT A COMMUNIQUE. THE FRG, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL LIKELY WANT A STATEMENT ON BERLIN. OTHER ALLIES WILL WANT TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT MBFR, CSCE AND OTHER TOPICS. WHILE A COMMUNIQUE WILL INEVITABLY EMBODY TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS THAT WILL MAKE IT IN PART "JUST ANOTHER COMMUNIQUE," IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE IN IT NEW ELEMENTS THAT CAN BE USEFULLY FEATURED IN PRESS DISCUSSION. AN APPENDIX COVERING DETAILS OF THE LTDP COULD PERHAPS BE ADDED. PRECEDENTS FOR COMMUNIQUE WITH DEFENSE SECTIONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE APRIL 1969 AND DECEMBER 1969 NAC COMMUNIQUE.

13. FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, WE ALSO BELIEVE AN UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF THE EAST/WEST STUDY, A KEY PROJECT OVER THE PAST YEAR, SHOULD BE FEATURED. SUCH A SUMMARY CAN BE SIMPLE, FORCEFUL AND INTERESTING. IT CAN HIGHLIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC BASIC EXPECTATIONS REGARDING THE EAST AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS, AT LEAST IN THE DEFENSE FIELD, FOR THE ALLIANCE.

14. WE DO NOT FAVOR EITHER A SEPARATE POLITICAL STATEMENT OR A POLITICAL STATEMENT THAT WOULD BE PART OF THE COMMUNIQUE (ALTHOUGH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE STATEMENT, AS OUTLINED, COULD BE WOVEN INTO THE COMMUNIQUE). WE BELIEVE THAT A POLITICAL STATEMENT FOCUSSED ON NATO WOULD ENGAGE US IN AN EXQUISITE SELF-TORTURE WITH THE ALLIES OVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS AND THAT THE RESULT WOULD PROBABLY ADD LITTLE TO THE OTTAWA DECLARATION.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ONY-00 SS-15 SSO-00 /028 W

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INDEED, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GAIN ANY  
ADVANCE OVER THE OTTAWA COMMUNIQUE, OR TO REACH ITS  
LEVEL, REGARDING ALLIED COMMITMENTS TO  
CONSULTATIONS.

15. TO CONCLUDE, WE AGREE THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE  
ALLIES ON ALL THESE ISSUES SHOULD BEGIN NOT LATER THAN  
APRIL 10. THE ALLIES MAY HAVE GOOD IDEAS OF THEIR  
OWN THAT WILL INFLUENCE US THINKING, AND THEY MAY  
SHOOT DOWN FAST SOME US PROPOSALS. WE SHOULD  
EXERCISE THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS  
PROMPTLY IN REGARD TO THE SUMMIT BY PUTTING  
FORWARD ILLUSTRATIVE PROPOSALS ON A TENTATIVE BASIS.  
WE COULD RESERVE FINAL US DECISIONS ON ILLUSTRATIVE  
PROPOSALS, AND THUS OBVIATE THE NEED TO HAMMER OUT  
FIRM WASHINGTON POSITIONS BEFORE IDEAS ARE FLOATED  
HERE. FINALLY, ALLIED CONSULTATIONS SHOULD ALSO  
FOCUS ON THE CENTRAL PURPOSES OF THE SUMMIT, ALONG  
THE LINES SUGGESTED ABOVE. BENNETT

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ALLIANCE, SUMMIT MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 22 mar 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978USNATO03021  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780126-0778  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** USNATO  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780335/aaaabdhrr.tel  
**Line Count:** 417  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
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**Message ID:** 3e481fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION EUR  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** ONLY, STADIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** ONLY, STADIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 may 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3232433  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: OBJECTIVES, INITIATIVES, AND CONSULTATIONS  
**TAGS:** OCON, PORC, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/3e481fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014